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Fish as a Special Case: Uncertainty and Diversity
The combination between ethics and science in the field of animal welfare is not novel.
Nonetheless, when we think of this combination in the area of fish welfare, novel
considerations arise (cf. Huntingford et al. 2006). This was the reason to organize an
expert meeting aiming to bring together a variety of academic disciplines that are
involved in welfare studies to discuss fish welfare. This expert meeting about fish
welfare and its moral implications, organized on November 29 and 30, 2010, by the
Ethics Institute of Utrecht University, has been the occasion of this Special Issue. The
meeting involved international experts from diverse academic backgrounds, includ-
ing marine biology, physiology, the philosophy of mind, and ethics. For this special
issue we have approached a number of the speakers at the expert meeting, but we have
also invited other researchers to make a contribution. During the meeting, it appeared
that the focus on fish makes a relevant difference and raises challenges both to the
individual disciplines and to the interplay between ethics and science. Fish are special.
Special in a biological and physiological sense, as well as from an ethical perspective.
In our view, moral decision making consists of a reflection process in which
facts, intuitions, and moral principles play a role (cf. Van der Burg 2008; Van der
Burg and van Willigenburg 1998). Each of these three tiers has its own input. For
example, in order to reach a decision about the implementation of certain welfare
measures in aquaculture, we need factual input about the consequences of different
welfare measures, about levels of fish consciousness and suffering, etc. However,
what particular facts one emphasizes or deems relevant, or how one interprets facts,
is not objective or value-neutral. Research methodologies and the interpretation of
research results are influenced by normative assumptions. In moral judgments, in
turn, intuitions play a role; for example, intuitions can be a signal that something
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morally problematic is at stake, and can be a check on moral principles. If moral
principles lead to very counter-intuitive results, this may be a reason to revise these
principles. At the same time, intuitions can be checked by the facts.
Regarding fish welfare, in all these three tiers of facts, intuitions, and principles,
we encounter uncertainty and diversity of moral opinion. This becomes clear if we
encounter questions of fish welfare from both a biological and an ethical
perspective. From a biological perspective, fish welfare is still a relatively under
researched area. The related debates on whether fish can feel pain or have levels of
consciousness are dominated by uncertainty, genuine disagreement, but also colored
by a lot of new developments. As several articles in this special issue make clear,
this is in no small measure due to the enormous variety of fish species that exist, of
which only a few have been the subject of research so far.
From an ethical point of view, fish are interesting because they represent a
borderline case. If we would conceive of moral considerability as a sliding scale, a
question about which dissensus exists is where on the scale we should put fish. Are
they closer to the moral position of mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians or are they
rather conceived of as a kind of semi-animal, between mammals and plants, as the
authors of the final contribution suggest? As a matter of fact, dissensus even exists
among animal ethicists about whether moral considerability can be conceived of as
a sliding scale at all (see Bovenkerk and Meijboom 2012). As such, the case of fish
presents a challenge to existing normative theories. If we would argue that fish are
equally morally considerable to mammals, could we still argue that their interests
are not equally significant? In a societal sense we encounter difficulties when
considering fish: they are hardly visible in our society and we often have no direct
relationship to them. Probably because of the lack of visual similarities to us and
because we do not normally share a common environment our intuitions regarding
fish are shaped differently than regarding other animals.
Three Questions of Fish Welfare
From a moral and a scientific point of view, what questions need to be answered in
order to make sense of the issue of fish welfare? Three main questions underlie this
special issue. Firstly, it is relevant whether fish can feel pain and suffer, or can feel
pleasure and enjoyment. Questions that are presupposed in this inquiry are whether
fish have a memory and are conscious. And if this is the case, secondly, what does
this mean for the way we should treat these animals? Thirdly, what are the views
and opinions of stakeholders and society at large about the capacities and moral
status of fish and what room is there for science and morality to influence these
views? The contributions in this special issue address these main questions.
Therefore the issue is divided into three parts.
Part 1: What Do We Mean When We Speak of Fish Welfare?
The central question of the first part is what we mean when we speak of fish
welfare. The two contributions review evidence regarding pain and cognition in
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fish and connect this to moral and broader philosophical questions. First,
Braithwaith, Huntingford, and Van den Bos discuss what evidence there is for
emotion and cognition in fish. Their broad review of relevant studies into fish
capacities focuses on teleost fishes of which some 27 thousand species exist. While
systematic research on behavior that indicates emotion and cognition has only been
carried out for a few fish species, the results show no fundamental difference with
observations in mammals. The authors stress that though ultimately we can never
know for certain what any animal feels, we can use a bottom-up approach to
generate knowledge. This approach uses arguing by analogy, interpreting
behavioral capacities, coupled with knowledge about brain function, and insight
into the circumstances of the animal in which emotion and cognition are likely to
promote fitness.
The authors give examples of experiments showing that certain fish exhibit
flexible behavior and suggest that fish need a capacity for cognition and emotion to
be able to do so. Next, they suggest that such capacities may very well vary between
different fish species and within the same species of fish, depending on individual,
sex-related, and life-history stage differences. For example, within one species
different individuals exhibit differing stress coping styles, influencing the level of
welfare in particular circumstances. Also, environmental influences, such as habitat
complexity, and social organization determine the complexity of a fish’s brain and
perhaps its capacity for suffering. The authors conclude that given the wide
variation between fish species there is no single answer to the question whether fish
can suffer and experience pleasure and more research needs to be done if we want to
be able to guarantee fish welfare. More knowledge might make it possible to select
fish species that are more appropriate as food as they are less likely to be stressed or
suffer in farming conditions.
Allen also starts his paper with the increasing attention for fish consciousness
and cognition. In his paper he elaborates the scientific controversy with respect to
fish cognition from a philosophical perspective. He raises the question of why
philosophers should care about fish consciousness. He argues that fish are interesting
from a philosophical perspective in two ways. On the one hand, fish entail a test of the
boundaries of existing conceptions of cognition and consciousness. On the other hand,
Allen sees in the current scientific controversies regarding fish clear indications that
help to understand the limits of experimentation in the fields of cognitive science or
animal behavior.
To show these two points he considers the work of Cabanac, who was one of the
speakers at the Utrecht Expert Meeting, as a reference point for his discussion on
what consciousness implies and on whether fish have consciousness. He concludes
that one of the main problems of the current debates start in the ‘‘label’’ fish. We
often speak about fish in generic terms, but also from a scientific perspective results
from one fish species, such a zebra or gold fish are immediately translated to claims
about consciousness of fish in general. Therefore, the author sees a task for
philosophers to help test and expand the limits of the currently used scientific and
philosophical conceptual schemes. This may help to avoid drawing conclusions too
hastily about fish as a enormously diverse set of species.
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Part 2: Why Should We Care About Fish Welfare?
The scientific and philosophical uncertainty that has been discussed in the first part
has direct implications for the ethical debate on why we should care about fish
welfare. However, just like Allen, Bovenkerk and Meijboom take the position that
ethicists do not have to wait for all the relevant aspects of every species of fish to be
scientifically investigated. The paper even argues that implementing and defining
fish welfare asks for a continuous interplay between science and ethics in a way that
both fields of research make their own contribution. The paper starts at the level of
the current problems of implementation. The authors show how these practical
problems are interrelated to a chain of questions and problems that cannot be
addressed without a genuine interplay between science and ethics. First, the paper
explicates and unravels this chain of questions and problems that show this
interplay. Second, the article shows how empirical uncertainty and moral pluralism
with respect to the moral importance of fish makes a process of continuous specific
interactions between science and ethics even more important than regarding other
questions of animal welfare.
In her article, Kaldeway addresses the interplay between science and ethics in the
case of fish welfare from the ethical perspective. She starts from an unconventional
perspective: Kantian practical reasoning theories that traditionally require quite
sophisticated cognitive capacities to be included as a moral agent. Fish are not likely
to meet such criteria even if one agrees on their being sentient. Nonetheless,
Kaldeway argues that it can be an important starting points in the discussion on
animal welfare. She shows that moral agents have reason to accept duties to animals
if these animals can be considered agents in a less demanding sense. This kind of
agency implies that they are motivated to pursue the objects of their desires, which
includes the desire not to suffer. This does not yet turn animals into moral agents,
but can be a reason for us as humans to accept moral requirements that involve
treating animals in a way that does not harm them. Whether fish have such desires
can be subject for further research, but Kaldeway argues that if fish have such
desires, we also have duties to them.
In their review of the welfare and environmental aspects of aquaculture Bergqvist
and Gunnarsson connect empirical research on the impacts of fish farming on fish
and nature (the facts) with moral views (the principles) on the permissibility of fish
consumption. They start their analysis from the fact that surprisingly little research
has been carried out on pain and on stress in fish as a result of farming and on the
environmental aspects. They indicate a number of issues of ethical concern in
aquaculture. The first category includes animal welfare. In spite of the genuine
uncertainty with respect to the cognitive capacities of fish that has been sketched in
the first part of this issue, the authors suggest giving fish the benefit of the doubt.
Their description of welfare impacts of aquaculture, divided into four stages—
breeding, growth, capturing/handling, and slaughter—supports precautionary
reasoning, as there appear to be many points at which fish are exposed to pain,
stress, injury, and disease. While some argue that in nature fish are also exposed to
many of these stressors, the authors agree with Huntingford et al. (2006) that there is
a moral distinction between how we are entitled to treat fish and how nature treats
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them. A practical distinction also exists, since in confinement fish cannot avoid
these stressors, while in the wild they at least have a chance of escape.
A second category of issues of ethical concern is related to the environmental
impacts of aquaculture, such as the decline of wild fish populations. This may
happen due to using fish caught in the wild for feed, introduction of non-indigenous
species, spreading of diseases, and habitat destruction. Furthermore, they stress the
threats to the environment through chemical and waste discharge, and destruction of
ecosystems. Based on their review they doubt whether it is possible to ethically
defend a fish diet.
Part 3: Fish Welfare: Who Cares?
The central question of the third part is who cares about fish welfare. The two
contributions in this part examine respectively stakeholder and lay person attitudes
and opinions regarding fish capacities and welfare.
Sustainability and animal welfare are the central topics in the paper by Kalshoven
and Meijboom. These topics are often mentioned, but it still remains relatively
unclear what welfare and sustainability entail in the context of fishing and fish
farming. To explore this, the authors focus on the views of fish buyers as a key actor
in the supply chain between the fisher or fish farmer and the consumer. Based on in-
depth interviews the authors analyze the moral and non-moral dilemmas with
respect to welfare and sustainability that fish buyers are confronted with. They
conclude that the focus on sustainability and animal welfare appear to be driven by
external and market factors. With respect to welfare, the study shows that this seems
more important for farmed than for wild fish. This is explained by the fact that fish
buyers feel a stronger responsibility regarding kept animals than wild fish that are
caught from the sea and oceans and seas. A further conclusion is that sustainability
is mainly based on labels. These labels, however, are considered less effective than
expected for coping with moral dilemmas. The authors explain this situation by
showing that labels are a rather procedural solution that leaves the genuine
dilemmas unaddressed. Therefore, the authors argue that labels are not a sufficient
tool to deal with moral concerns. Further cooperation in the process of reflecting on
and elaborating the sector’s core values appears to be a more promising road
to follow.
Kupsala, Jokinen, and Vinnari relate the results of a large survey analyzing
public attitudes and views regarding the welfare of farmed fish in Finland. While
aquaculture has quickly become intensive, it appears that the lay public has
remained unaware of this. The survey shows that not many citizens are concerned
about the welfare of farmed fish. The authors point out several causes for this lack of
concern and argue that this lack confirms that fish are culturally constructed as a
type of ‘‘semi-animal,’’ a category between sentient animals and plants. Based on
their analysis, the authors conclude that we cannot expect great consumer pressure
to improve conditions at fish farms in Finland and they call for more research into
the welfare and cognitive capacities of fish in order to raise public awareness. The
particular cultural context in which this survey was carried out raises the question
whether similar lack of consumer pressure can be expected in countries outside
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Finland, where fishing is perhaps less tied to traditional rural views about
subsistence. Nevertheless, as the authors point out, other studies show a lack of
concern for fish welfare in other European countries as well.
Fish as a Continuous Challenge for all Disciplines
The rationale for this special issue has been the claim that the combination between
science and ethics in the area of fish welfare leads to novel considerations. The
seven papers illustrate the importance of a genuine reflection process in which moral
intuitions, morally relevant facts, and moral principles are taken into consideration.
This implies that science cannot wait until all uncertainties regarding fish welfare
have been resolved, before moral questions will arise. At the same time, ethics need
not wait to deal with the plurality of moral views on our duties regarding fish until
all scientists agree. Finally, it shows that the public debate cannot be properly
understood if the relevant facts and the moral considerations aren’t taken seriously.
The papers show that the recent advances in empirical research have resulted in
morally relevant facts and that ethical analysis is of importance for the scope of the
scientific research. In other words, it shows once again that understanding and
guaranteeing fish welfare requires a real interplay between science and ethics and
that work is still to be done by all disciplines.
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